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Abstract
Pleiotropy has been suggested as a novel mechanism for stabilising cooperation in bacteria
and other microbes. The hypothesis is that linking cooperation with a trait that provides a
personal (private) benefit can outweigh the cost of cooperation in situations when coopera-
tion would not be favoured by mechanisms such as kin selection. We analysed the theoreti-
cal plausibility of this hypothesis, with analytical models and individual-based simulations.
We found that (1) pleiotropy does not stabilise cooperation, unless the cooperative and pri-
vate traits are linked via a genetic architecture that cannot evolve (mutational constraint); (2)
if the genetic architecture is constrained in this way, then pleiotropy favours any type of trait
and not especially cooperation; (3) if the genetic architecture can evolve, then pleiotropy
does not favour cooperation; and (4) there are several alternative explanations for why traits
may be linked, and causality can even be predicted in the opposite direction, with coopera-
tion favouring pleiotropy. Our results suggest that pleiotropy could only explain cooperation
under restrictive conditions and instead show how social evolution can shape the genetic
architecture.
Author summary
Recent research into microbial communities has revealed that the cooperative secretion of
molecules—which are produced by individual cells and benefit neighbouring cells—is
linked to the production of privately beneficial intracellular enzymes. This pleiotropic link
between commonly and privately beneficial traits has been suggested as a novel way for
maintaining cooperation in conditions under which it would otherwise be outcompeted
by cheating cells. The reason is that cheats, which do not cooperate, would also lose the
benefit of producing the private trait and thus suffer a fitness disadvantage. We test the
plausibility of this hypothesis with analytical models and individual-based simulations.
We find that cooperation can only be stabilised if one makes restrictive assumptions
about the genetic architecture, such that the pleiotropic link with a private trait cannot be
broken through further evolution. If the genetic architecture can evolve, then natural
selection can favour mutants that do not cooperate but that still perform the private trait,
leading to the breakdown of cooperation. We discuss a number of alternative explanations
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for the observation of linkage between cooperative and private traits and show that causal-
ity may even arise in the opposite direction to that previously predicted—when coopera-
tion is favoured, this may select for pleiotropy. Our results suggest a novel explanation for
why cooperative and private traits may be linked and show how social evolution can
shape the genetic architecture.
Introduction
Recent empirical breakthroughs in microbial genetics have suggested a novel mechanism for
maintaining cooperation [1–9]. The problem with cooperation is that noncooperative cheats
can avoid the cost of cooperating whilst still gaining the benefits, allowing them to outcompete
cooperators [10]. Consequently, without some mechanism to favour it, cooperation would
not be evolutionarily stable. In microbes, clonal growth means that interactions will often be
between close relatives, and so cooperation will be favoured because it is directed towards indi-
viduals that share the genes for cooperation [10–16] (kin selection).
Experiments on both slime moulds and bacteria have led to the suggestion that pleiotropy
provides a novel way to stabilise cooperation when it would not otherwise be favoured by
another mechanism, such as kin selection [1–6]. These experiments have discovered cases in
which two traits are either controlled by the same gene or coregulated (pleiotropy) and in
which these two traits are a cooperative trait and a trait that provides a personal (private) bene-
fit. For example, in the bacteria Pseudomonas aeruginosa, the quorum sensing signalling net-
work controls both: (1) the production of several factors that are excreted from the cell and
provide a cooperative benefit to the local population of cells [17–22] (public goods) and (2)
private traits such as the production of intracellular enzymes involved in metabolism, and cya-
nide resistance [3–5]. Consequently, a mutant that did not respond to quorum sensing would
avoid the cost of cooperatively producing public goods (cheats) but also pay the cost of not
performing the private traits. If this cost of not performing the pleiotropically linked private
goods was high enough, this could stabilise cooperation, when it would otherwise be outcom-
peted by cheats. In different papers, this linkage is referred to as pleiotropy, coregulation, or
metabolic constraint, and it has been suggested as a key mechanism for stabilising cooperation,
alongside factors such as kin selection and policing [1–9,23,24] (S1 Table).
However, these observations of pleiotropy between cooperative and private traits do not
necessarily imply that pleiotropy is stabilising cooperation by preventing the invasion of cheats,
as alternate explanations are possible. One possibility is that the private and cooperative traits
are favoured independently, and it is just more efficient to regulate them together (pleiotropi-
cally). Another issue is the extent to which the pleiotropy hypothesis relies on the underlying
genetic architecture being relatively fixed, imposing a constraint on evolution. If the genetic
architecture could itself evolve, then mutation could produce individuals that still performed
the other, relatively essential trait but that did not cooperate. In line with this prediction, the
emergence of such cheats has been shown experimentally in the bacteria P. aeruginosa, where
private and public goods are linked by quorum sensing [21]. When cooperation was not
favoured, individuals rewired the control of the cooperative trait, thereby stopping its produc-
tion while still producing the private trait. This resulted in a greater competitive ability relative
to cooperators [18,21,25].
Another possibility is that the causal link could be in the opposite direction, with coopera-
tion favouring pleiotropy rather than pleiotropy stabilising cooperation. For example, consider
a scenario, without pleiotropy, in which cooperation was favoured by a mechanism such as kin
Pleiotropy and cooperation
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selection. If a noncooperative mutant arose, it might initially increase in frequency locally but
would eventually be outcompeted by cooperators. Nonetheless, the initial spread of these non-
cooperators would impose a short-term cost to the cooperators from which they arose and
with which they would be competing [26–29]. Pleiotropy between cooperation and another
privately beneficial trait would provide a mechanism to prevent the initial spread of cheats and
hence could be favoured to reduce or avoid this ‘cheat load’ [28,30].
We theoretically model the conditions required for either pleiotropy to stabilise coopera-
tion or the alternate possibility that cooperation favours pleiotropy. We consider a form of
cooperation common in bacteria, in which cells produce a factor that is excreted from the cell
and which then provides a benefit to the local population of cells [31]. This can be modelled as
a public goods game, in which individuals can pay a cost to perform a task that benefits the
local group. We first consider a simple scenario analytically, for which the underlying architec-
ture is fixed and does not evolve. This analysis formalises previous verbal arguments for how
pleiotropy could stabilise cooperation. We then use an individual-based simulation approach
to test whether allowing the genetic architecture to evolve influences the extent to which pleiot-
ropy is evolutionarily stable. This simulation approach also allows us to test the alternate possi-
bility that cooperation favours pleiotropy.
Results
Public goods cooperation
To provide a baseline, we consider the cooperative production of public goods in a deliberately
simple scenario, where there is no pleiotropy with other traits [32–35]. Our aim is to examine
what happens in the simplest (null) case without recourse to details that will vary across spe-
cies. We assume a haploid population subdivided into a large number of local patches, each
of size N, where the mean genetic relatedness between individuals is r [36]. Individuals can
secrete a public good molecule at personal cost c. Production of this public good provides a
benefit b that is shared equally among all patch members, even cheats that do not contribute.
We assume that this cost and benefit influences fecundity and that after reproduction, adults
die, and all offspring disperse to compete globally for some new patch to start the life cycle
again (nonoverlapping generations and no kin competition). The production of the public
good molecule will be favoured when rb̃ − c̃> 0, where b̃ = (N − 1)b/N, −c ̃ = b/N − c (Eq 3 of
Methods). The b̃ term represents the average benefit that public goods production provides to
the other members of the group. The −c̃ term represents the benefit provided to the actor by
their own public good production (b/N), minus the cost of producing that public good (c).
This standard result is just Hamilton’s rule for a linear public goods game, showing how coop-
eration can be favoured by kin selection if the indirect benefit to relatives (rb̃) outweigh the
direct cost (c̃) [10,34,37–39].
Pleiotropic cooperation
We then examined the scenario in which the cooperative trait is linked pleiotropically to a pri-
vate trait that is important for reproduction. Pleiotropic links between private and public traits
have been discussed in two ways in the microbial literature, either because they are controlled
by the same gene, or because they are controlled by two linked genes. For example, in Dictyos-
telium discoideum, mutants in the single gene dimA both do not receive the signal for the cell
to differentiate into a prestalk cell and are excluded from spores [1]. In contrast, in P. aerugi-
nosa, different genes control different traits, but these traits are linked by the quorum sensing
system [2]. We consider both types and shall return to the extent to which they represent
pleiotropy.
Pleiotropy and cooperation
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In this section, we assume that the cooperation and private traits have to be linked. This
could be due to either (1) the two traits being controlled by a single gene, as in the D. discoi-
deum example, or (2) the two traits being controlled by separate genes but the activity of these
genes being linked in a way that cannot be broken by mutation (no mutational accessibility).
We assume that not performing the private trait reduces an individual’s fecundity by an
amount d. We compared the fitness of pleiotropic cooperators with individuals that lacked this
pleiotropic trait and therefore neither cooperated nor performed the private trait, as has been
done in laboratory experiments [2–4]. In this scenario, switching from defection to pleiotropic
cooperation still changes an individual’s inclusive fitness by rb̃ − c̃, but the direct fitness cost c̃
is decreased by d (Eq 4). Hence, the area where cooperation is favoured is larger when cooper-
ation is linked pleiotropically with a private trait and where that private trait provides a relative
reproductive advantage (Fig 1 and S1 Fig).
An extreme case of this model is when pleiotropy links cooperation to an essential private
trait. We considered this specific scenario because, in the empirical examples in which pleiot-
ropy has linked cooperation to a private trait, the fitness of individuals that do not perform
this private trait could be effectively zero [2–5]. We investigated this case by assuming that the
fitness of noncooperators is zero and that the public good is equally distributed to all remain-
ing pleiotropic cooperators. In this case, pleiotropic cooperation provides a direct fitness bene-
fit (–c̃> 0), and pleiotropic cooperators always interact exclusively with other pleiotropic
cooperators, and so relatedness does not matter (b̃ = 0; Eq 5). Consequently, noncooperators
are never able to outcompete pleiotropic cooperators.
Pleiotropy promotes cooperation and anything else
Both previous verbal arguments and our above results have focused on how pleiotropy can
help stabilise cooperative traits that benefit other individuals [1–8] (b> 0). However, our
above analysis reveals that pleiotropy can also help favour traits that otherwise provide no ben-
efits (b = 0, c> 0) or even harm (b< 0, c> 0) both their bearer and other individuals on the
patch (Fig 1 and S1 Fig). Consequently, rather than pleiotropy stabilising cooperation per se,
pleiotropy can help stabilise any type of trait.
For example, consider the extreme case in the opposite direction, of a harming trait that
reduces the fitness of everyone in the social group, including the individual that produces it
(b< 0). This would be analogous to bacterial cells producing an antibiotic or bacteriocin to
which they are not resistant. If the genetic architecture is fixed, this harming trait would be
favoured if the cost to private-good nonproducers (d) outweighs the sum of the cost of per-
forming the harming trait (c), the cost of harming relatives ([N– 1]b/N), and the cost of harm-
ing oneself (b/N). An analogous point has been made in the cooperation in human literature,
in which it was pointed out that punishment could help stabilise anything and not just cooper-
ation [40].
The evolution of genetic architecture
Our above analyses have assumed that pleiotropy is a fixed constraint on the genetic architec-
ture, such that individuals can either perform both the private and the public trait or perform
neither. This could occur via the two traits being controlled by a single gene or by two linked
genes whose link cannot be broken by mutation. However, the genetic architecture can evolve
over time [21,41–43], and assuming that it cannot evolve could result in misleading conclu-
sions [44,45]. For example, there is no reason that the private traits that have been observed to
be pleiotropically linked to cooperation in bacteria could not in principle be independently
regulated [21,46,47]. The key point here is that mutational accessibility, or pathway rewiring,
Pleiotropy and cooperation
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could break the pleiotropic link, making traits independent. Previous verbal arguments and
our above model have assumed that neither mutation nor different expression pathways can
unlink the cooperation and private traits.
We used an individual-based simulation approach to investigate the consequences for
cooperation of allowing mutation to unlink the cooperation and private traits and hence allow
the genetic architecture to evolve. To approximate a microbial life history, we assumed a hap-
loid population in which subpopulations grow with clonal reproduction on patches before dis-
persing to compete globally for new patches. Because reproduction is clonal, both traits are
perfectly transmitted to daughter cells. The population is subdivided into np = 100 patches.
At the beginning of the life cycle, each patch is colonised by NF = 100 founders, which leave
N = 10 initial individuals on the patch. In order to vary relatedness across the entire range
from r = 0 to r = 1, we vary the likelihood with which these 10 initial individuals are sampled
Fig 1. Pleiotropy can help stabilise all forms of social trait. We consider all possible forms of social interaction by
considering a trait that has a fecundity effect −c for the individual performing it and a fecundity effect b that is shared
amongst all the members of the group. If b> 0, then the trait is helpful, providing a benefit to both self and others
(public good), whereas if b< 0, then the trait is harming and costly to both self and others. If c> 0, then the trait is
costly to perform, but if c< 0, then performing the trait provides some personal benefit. The dark coloured area shows
where the trait would be favoured. The area to the left of the dashed line shows where the trait will be favoured when
the trait also has some pleiotropic private benefit (d). The lighter coloured area represents the extent to which
pleiotropy can help stabilise social traits. Parameters: N = 10, r = 0.5, d = 0.4.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2006671.g001
Pleiotropy and cooperation
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from the same parent founder. This allows us to vary relatedness without varying the number
of initial cells, as would occur when different numbers of lineages colonise a patch and can
then grow clonally [48]. The cells on a patch potentially produce a public good and grow for
k = 10 generations. We assume that individuals have a baseline growth rate of 1 + g so that
population size grows. Mutations occur during the growth phase. During the 10 generations of
growth, only parents die after each reproduction event, and therefore, there is no population
regulation, and generations are nonoverlapping. After these 10 generations, the remaining
cells disperse globally and begin the life cycle again.
For comparison, we first analysed the scenario in which there is no pleiotropic private trait.
Our simulation results for this case were in close agreement with our analytical predictions—
cooperation is favoured as predicted by Hamilton’s rule (Fig 2A). Cooperation in our simula-
tion evolves under a slightly larger area than predicted by our analytical model, because relat-
edness increases during the growth phase, especially at low initial relatedness (see top-left
corner of Fig 2A and 2B and S2 Fig).
We then considered the scenario in which cooperation is always pleiotropically linked to a
private trait and in the specific case when not producing the private good leads to the individ-
ual not reproducing (i.e., their fecundity is 0). In this case, the only possible mutation is to not
express both traits, as has been assumed previously [1–9,23]. We focused on this extreme sce-
nario, as a conservative assumption, because it is the case in which pleiotropy could be most
effective in stabilising cooperation. Again, our simulation results were in agreement with our
analytical results—pleiotropic cooperation is always favoured over noncooperators regardless
of relatedness, but the population goes extinct when the average fecundity is lower than 1 (S3
Fig). In the supplementary information, we relaxed the assumption that private nonproducers
have fecundity 0 and let them reproduce, albeit with a baseline fitness that is reduced by d. We
show that pleiotropic cooperation prevails as long as the cost of not expressing the private trait
d is sufficiently high (S4 Fig).
We then examined the consequences of allowing the genetic architecture to evolve (Fig 3).
We allowed mutation from a genotype in which both the private and public goods are linked
Fig 2. If the genetic architecture can evolve, pleiotropy does not stabilise cooperation. (A) Nonpleiotropic
cooperators compete with cheats. (B) A pleiotropic link is allowed to coevolve with public good production (all
genotypes and mutations I and II in Fig 3). The x axis is the relatedness, r, measured between the N individuals after
patch colonisation. The dashed line represents the analytical prediction, c − b/N = r(N − 1)b/N, for when Hamilton’s
rule is satisfied, assuming that migration occurs every generation (i.e., k = 1; Eq 3 in the Methods section). The
frequency of cooperation was measured as the proportion of cooperative genotypes in the population (i.e., pleiotropic
and nonpleiotropic cooperators and cooperative private nonproducers; Fig 3). Irrespective of whether pleiotropy can
evolve, the cooperative production of public goods is only favoured when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied (rb̃ − c ̃> 0).
Parameters: c = 0.1, g = 0.5, growth phase k = 10, mutation rate μ = 0.001.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2006671.g002
Pleiotropy and cooperation
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pleiotropically (pleiotropic cooperators) to one in which they are independent (nonpleiotropic
cooperators) and vice versa. Hence, pleiotropy can be acquired or lost (mutations I and II in
Fig 3). Pleiotropic and nonpleiotropic cooperators are otherwise phenotypically similar. As a
consequence, pleiotropy is now also in competition with all nonpleiotropic genotypes, for
which the private and public good traits are independent (Fig 3). Once traits are independently
regulated, a single mutation will influence only one of the traits and not both, as the link
between them has been broken. As above, we consider the extreme case in which the private
trait is essential, such that individuals that do not produce it cannot reproduce.
When we allowed the genetic architecture to evolve, we found that the potential for pleiot-
ropy, where the traits could be linked, did not favour cooperation. Specifically, the production
of public goods was only favoured in the same area as when there was no potential for pleiot-
ropy (compare Fig 2A and 2B), which is when the indirect benefits outweighed the direct
costs, and Hamilton’s rule was satisfied (rb̃ − c̃> 0). In the other areas, where public good
cooperation was not favoured by kin selection, mutation can create individuals for which the
private trait and public goods production are not linked (mutation II in Fig 3). These individu-
als can then mutate to create a cheat that does not produce the public good but still performs
the private trait. Selection favours these cheats, which can then invade and outcompete pleio-
tropic cooperators.
Fig 3. Genotypes studied in our model and the possible mutational pathways (blue arrows). Pleiotropy can evolve
from a genetic architecture in which the private trait (p, P) and cooperation (c, C) are unlinked (mutation I) and is
either allowed or not allowed to revert (mutation II). All other mutations are always possible. During reproduction, a
mutation occurs with probability μ in each offspring, in which case either one randomly chosen locus or the
pleiotropic link in cooperators is changed. We also performed simulations with more realistic mutation rates, for
which the probability of gaining a function (either cooperation, the private trait, or pleiotropy) was reduced by a factor
of either 10 or 100 (S5 and S6 Figs).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2006671.g003
Pleiotropy and cooperation
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Our result shows that in a simple case, if the underlying genetic architecture can evolve,
then pleiotropy does not provide a mechanism to stabilise cooperation. Our aim was to cap-
ture the key feature of the ‘pleiotropy stabilises cooperation’ hypothesis, that private and
public traits could be linked. Consequently, we assumed that the linkage between traits could
either be gained or lost by mutation, which could be applied to a range of specific genetic
architectures.
More generally, our results illustrate how assuming fixed genetic associations between
cooperation and other traits can lead to misleading conclusions. The problem is that assuming
certain types of associations can force evolutionary outcomes that would otherwise be unlikely.
This has been discussed previously in the context of traits such as punishment, rewarding, kin
recognition, and green beards [45,49–52]. Furthermore, our conclusions are supported by a
recent experiment in P. aeruginosa that showed the evolution of cheats that circumvent the
expression of a cooperative trait but still produce a private trait [21].
Robustness and different genetic architectures
We tested the robustness of our results by relaxing our assumption about how mutation can
influence the genetic architecture (mutational accessibility) in three ways. In all three cases, we
found essentially identical results, that the potential for pleiotropic links between traits did not
stabilise cooperation. First, we ran simulations with more realistic mutation rates, in which los-
ing a function was either 10 or 100 times more likely than gaining a function (S5 and S6 Figs).
Second, we allowed the genetic architecture to evolve in a number of different ways, by either
preventing pleiotropy to be lost, allowing pleiotropic cooperators to generate viable cheats, or
allowing all mutations (section S1.1 of S1 Text and S7 Fig). Third, we explicitly modelled the
link between the cooperation and private traits by introducing a regulator for each trait and
allowing the private trait’s regulator to become universal (pleiotropic) and hence regulate both
traits at the same time (section S1.2 and S8–S11 Figs).
In contrast, Fre´noy and colleagues [6] suggested that the potential for genetic links between
private and cooperation traits can help populations resist the invasion of cheats. They found
that where there was more pleiotropy between cooperative and metabolic traits, cooperation
was lost more slowly and in some cases was maintained and that when allowing cooperation to
evolve de novo, it evolved with links with metabolic traits. Our models differ in a number of
ways, and therefore, we cannot say for sure why our conclusions differ. One possibility is that,
because some of the pleiotropic interactions by Fre´noy and colleagues [6] were due to gene
overlap and/or operon sharing, the pleiotropic link could not be easily broken (personal com-
munication, D. Misevic). The resistance of such pleiotropy to cheat invasion could have been
influenced by a number of factors. For example, (1) the values chosen (analogous to a single
combination of b and r) may have led to weak selection against cooperation and hence weak
selection for unlinked genetic architecture; or (2) maybe longer simulations (>2,000 genera-
tions) or larger population sizes (>1,024 individuals) were required for the combination of
mutation and selection to break up the links. Targeted simulations of different scenarios
would allow the importance of these issues to be determined.
Cooperation promotes pleiotropy
Our above results suggest that if the genetic architecture can evolve, pleiotropy will not help
stabilise cooperation (Fig 2). Instead, the private and public good traits have to be linked in
such a way that the pleiotropy is unavoidable for pleiotropy to stabilise cooperation (Fig 1; S1
and S3 Figs). Considering the empirical examples from microbes, it is not clear why the traits
would always have to be linked pleiotropically [1–6,46,47]. For example, the production of
Pleiotropy and cooperation
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intracellular and extracellular factors in bacteria could evolve to be controlled by different
circuits [21]. We suggest that unless it is explicitly shown otherwise, the null hypothesis
should be that the genetic architecture can evolve, and hence, pleiotropy will not help stabilise
cooperation.
We hypothesise that causality could even be in the opposite direction, with cooperation
favouring pleiotropy. We tested this by comparing the relative proportion of pleiotropic and
nonpleiotropic cooperators in the area where Hamilton’s rule was satisfied. We examined
the proportion of pleiotropic cooperators relative to nonpleiotropic cooperators—rather than
relative to all nonpleiotropic genotypes (including cheats)—for the following reason. When
Hamilton’s rule is satisfied, both pleiotropic and nonpleiotropic cooperators are fully favoured
(Fig 2B). In this case, the null hypothesis is that they are equally common (i.e., 0.5). A propor-
tion of pleiotropic cooperators relative to all cooperative genotypes above 0.5 would show evi-
dence that pleiotropy is indeed favoured. In support of our hypothesis, we found that, when
Hamilton’s rule was satisfied, pleiotropic cooperators were relatively more common than non-
pleiotropic cooperators, provided both the public good benefit (b) and relatedness (r) were
high (Fig 4A and 4B). Consequently, pleiotropy is being favoured in the conditions under
which cooperation is strongly selected for by kin selection (Fig 4A and 4B). We found similar
results when the pleiotropic link was modelled more explicitly (S5 and S6 Figs). A similar
point that genetic assortment (i.e., relatedness) could favour pleiotropy was hypothesised by
Fre´noy and colleagues [6], but they did not test whether increasing assortment, and hence
selection for cooperation, leads to more pleiotropy.
In our model, cooperation favours pleiotropy because it reduces the mutational ‘cheat load’
locally (Fig 5). If the production of public goods is favoured by kin selection, then any nonpro-
ducers that arise by mutation will eventually be outcompeted [32,34]. However, nonproducers
will be able to initially invade within a subpopulation [18,19,53–57]. This initial invasion will
reduce the fitness of the cooperative lineage from which they evolved [27–29]. Pleiotropic link-
age with a private trait prevents the nonproducers from invading and hence provides a fitness
advantage to pleiotropic cooperative lineages, relative to cooperative lineages where produc-
tion of the public good is not linked to a private trait. The key point here is that pleiotropy is
only favoured if cooperation was otherwise favoured by a mechanism such as kin selection.
Consistent with this cheat load hypothesis, an increase in the mutation rate makes pleiotropy
more likely to be favoured (Fig 4A and 4B).
To test whether nonpleiotropic cooperative lineages did suffer a cheat load, we ran addi-
tional simulations to examine how pleiotropy influenced growth in patches of cooperators.
We compared the cheat load at the end of a single growth phase between conditions with
and without mutations in patches started with 10 cooperators but where there were NPC
pleiotropic cooperators and 10 − NPC nonpleiotropic cooperators. Without mutations,
patches can grow maximally and reach maximum average fitness Wmax = 1 + g − c + b/n +
(n − 1)b/n = 1 + g − c + b, as no cheat can emerge. With mutations, however, cheats emerge
and impair their local patch growth. Cheat load was therefore measured as the difference
between the maximum attainable average fitness in the absence of mutations and the
observed average fitness with mutations W [28,30]. As predicted, patches with more pleio-
tropic cooperators at the beginning of the growth phase eventually suffered a lower cheat
load and thus had a higher average fitness than patches with more nonpleiotropic coopera-
tors (Fig 4C). The reason is that it takes more mutations to generate viable cheats from a
genetic architecture in which private and cooperation traits are pleiotropically linked, as in
[6]. In pleiotropic cooperators, the private and cooperation traits first have to be unlinked.
This generates nonpleiotropic cooperators, which in turn need to undergo a second muta-
tion to generate viable cheats (Fig 3).
Pleiotropy and cooperation
PLOS Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2006671 October 25, 2018 9 / 25
Our results emphasise the importance of distinguishing between short-term invasion and
long-term evolutionary stability. Pleiotropy does not help stabilise cooperation over evolution-
ary time—cooperation is only favoured in the region where Hamilton’s rule is satisfied because
of indirect fitness benefits (Fig 2). In contrast, pleiotropy does slow down the extent to which
cheats will arise and invade in the short term (Fig 4C). The crucial point is that these cheats
would not be successful in the long term—as soon as they disperse to a new patch, their fitness
would be effectively zero. What matters for evolution is the long-term dynamics. Conse-
quently, although pleiotropy protects cooperators against the short-term invasion of cheats, it
does not influence whether cheats can successfully invade and outcompete cooperation on an
evolutionary timescale. Another way of thinking about this is that pleiotropy provides an
Fig 4. Cooperation promotes pleiotropy. (A) and (B) show the proportion of pleiotropy relative to all cooperative
genotypes (i.e., pleiotropic cooperators, nonpleiotropic cooperators, and cooperative private nonproducers). In both
panels, when both relatedness (r) and the benefit of cooperation (b) are high, and thus there is strong selection for
cooperation, pleiotropy is favoured. Because pleiotropic and nonpleiotropic are phenotypically similar, we expect them
to be present in similar proportions relative to each other in the absence of mutations (i.e., 0.5). Hence, a frequency of
pleiotropic relative to nonpleiotropic cooperators above 0.5 shows evidence of an advantage to pleiotropic cooperators.
A comparison of panels (A) and (B) shows that increasing mutation rate μ leads to more pleiotropy. Panel (C) shows
the cheat load on local patches during a single growth phase (mutation rate μ = 0.005) for different values of the
cooperation benefit b. Each patch is started with 10 cooperators, and the x axis shows the number of those cooperators
for which cooperation was pleiotropically linked to an essential private trait. Cheat load is computed as follows. We
measure the difference between average fitness without mutations, Wmax (maximum attainable average fitness for
cooperators in the absence of cheats), and average fitness with mutations, W [28,30]. The bars show this difference
expressed as a percentage of maximum attainable fitness, i.e., 100 × (Wmax −W)/Wmax. Increased pleiotropy leads to a
decreased accumulation of cheats and, in turn, a lower cheat load. Both Wmax and W are averages taken over 104
patches. In all panels, all genotypes and mutations I and II in Fig 3 are allowed. Parameters: c = 0.1, g = 0.5, k = 10.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2006671.g004
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evolutionary advantage against nonpleiotropic cooperators but not against noncooperative
cheats (Fig 5).
The extent to which pleiotropy is favoured will depend upon a number of factors. Pleiotro-
pic and nonpleiotropic cooperators are phenotypically similar, and the cheat load is generated
from rare mutations. Consequently, the evolutionary forces favouring pleiotropic over non-
pleiotropic cooperators are actually weak, explaining why pleiotropy does not go to fixation
(Fig 4). We found similar results when mutations were 10 times more likely to lead to a loss
rather than a gain of function. However, pleiotropy was favoured only with high relatedness
and large cooperation benefits, even more so with a mutation bias of 100 (in which case both r
and b need to be close to 1 for pleiotropy to be favoured with μ = 0.005; S6 Fig). More gener-
ally, our argument is analogous to how pleiotropic mechanisms could help control the spreads
of cancer, if cancer can be conceptualised of as a kind of cheat, within its multicellular host
[58,59]. Another issue is that if private traits were not essential, then mutation could generate
viable—albeit less fit—cheats that also do not produce private traits. Here, patches with pleio-
tropic cooperators would still suffer less from cheat load than patches with nonpleiotropic
cooperators, where cheats that produce the private would be generated by mutations. In this
case, we predict that the cheat load effect would still favour pleiotropy, though to a lesser extent
than in the extreme case in which the private trait is essential.
In contrast to how pleiotropy can favour any type of trait (Fig 1), our above argument that
cooperation favours pleiotropy only works for cooperative traits. A privately beneficial trait
would not favour pleiotropy, because the loss of that trait would incur an immediate fitness
cost anyway. Also, mutants in either privately beneficial traits do not impose a growth cost
locally, because there are no social interactions. There are no cheats if the two traits are private.
In contrast, even though they are selected against in the long term, cheats gain a short-term
advantage, which is costly to the cooperators they are invading—pleiotropy is favoured to
remove this short-term advantage. In confirmation of this, when we examined a privately
Fig 5. The cheat load hypothesis. (A) When cooperation is favoured, pleiotropic cooperators that undergo mutations
generate cheating mutants that do not express an essential private trait and thus are not able to grow locally. (B) When
cooperation is not linked to an essential private trait, noncooperators (cheats) are able to grow locally, which reduces
the absolute number of dispersing cooperators. Patches with more pleiotropic cooperators export more individuals,
and therefore, cooperators with pleiotropy have an advantage over cooperators without pleiotropy. Pleiotropy does not
influence the extent to which cooperators are stable against the invasion of noncooperative cheats in the long term.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2006671.g005
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beneficial trait (b = 0 and c< 0) in our simulations, rather than a cooperative trait, we found
that pleiotropy was not favoured (S12 Fig).
Fluctuating environments
We further hypothesised that the cheat load problem could be exacerbated in fluctuating envi-
ronments, where cooperation alternates between being favoured and not favoured. The reason
is as follows. If cooperation becomes unfavourable, cheating becomes strongly selected for.
Then, local patches with more pleiotropic cooperators, which generate fewer cheats, would
produce a higher number of cooperators and hence have a higher fitness when the conditions
favouring cooperation returned. To test this idea, we ran simulations in which every 10 genera-
tions (i.e., every growth phase), cooperation alternates between being beneficial (b> 0) and
not beneficial (b = 0).
We found that fluctuating benefits b decrease the region where cooperation is favoured
(S13A and S13C Fig). This is because the benefit b = 0 half the time. As before, we found that
cooperation was only favoured in the region where Hamilton’s rule was satisfied and hence
favoured by kin selection (rb̃ − c̃> 0; S13 Fig). Furthermore, and also as before, pleiotropic
cooperators were increasingly common when benefits are large and r is high and hence when
cooperation was otherwise favoured (S13B and S13D Fig). Comparing simulations with and
without pleiotropy, we found that when pleiotropy was allowed to evolve, it decreased the
extent to which cheats built up and hence reduced the ‘cheat load’ (S14 Fig). We found qualita-
tively similar results with fluctuating population structure (alternating between r = 0.01 and
r> 0.01), although cooperation decreased to a lesser extent (S15 and S16 Figs). This further
confirms that if cooperation is first favoured because of kin selection, pleiotropy does not sta-
bilise cooperation after a subsequent decease in relatedness. Overall, these results in fluctuating
environments provide further support to how cooperation could favour pleiotropy.
Mutations in pleiotropically regulated genes
In the previous sections, we made the restrictive assumption that mutations cannot occur in
pleiotropically regulated genes. For example, when pleiotropy was acquired, no mutations
could knock out either the private or public traits: mutants either lost pleiotropy or stopped
expressing both genes. In experiments, however, mutants that lose the ability to express the
public trait but keep expressing the essential private trait do exist [2]. Such mutations are
expected to reduce the advantage of pleiotropy because they generate viable, private good–
producing cheats.
To test how mutations in pleiotropic genotypes influence the resistance of pleiotropy
against cheat load, we ran simulations in which we allowed mutations at both the private and
public good loci in pleiotropic individuals, thereby varying mutational accessibility. As before,
we found that pleiotropy is favoured when cooperation provides large benefits and relatedness
is high, especially when the mutation rate is also high (S17A and S17B Fig). Although these
simulations led to a higher frequency of cheating mutants (compare Fig 4C and S17C Fig),
patches with more pleiotropic cooperators still produced fewer cheating mutants (S17C Fig).
This is because a fraction of the mutations in pleiotropic cooperators generate noncooperative
private nonproducers that cannot profit from public goods and hence do not impair their local
patch growth. Overall, these results confirm that cooperation promotes pleiotropy rather than
the reverse, even under these relaxed conditions.
More generally, we have taken a relatively heuristic approach, but there are many possible
ways to model genome circuits that could lead to pleiotropy. Genetic details could influence
the extent to which pleiotropy reduces the cheat load and hence the extent to which it is
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favoured, as well as the time required for mutations to break this pleiotropic link. For example,
introducing a mutation bias in our simulations led to a considerably reduced advantage of
pleiotropy against cheat load. Pleiotropy was favoured only with both very high relatedness
and large cooperation benefits (S5 and S6 Figs). Consequently, as we find out more about spec-
ificities, it could be useful to model other genetic circuits.
Discussion
What now?
Overall, there are at least four scenarios that could explain the observed instances of pleiotropy
between a private and a cooperative trait [1–5]: (1) the association between the private and
cooperative traits is a relative coincidence, with no adaptive significance; (2) both traits are
favoured under the same conditions, and there is an efficiency benefit to having them coregu-
lated; (3) pleiotropy stabilises cooperation; or (4) cooperation favours pleiotropy. The first
hypothesis is our null model. The second hypothesis is analogous to a common explanation
for why multiple traits are controlled by quorum sensing, with different traits being favoured
at different stages of the growth cycle and at different population densities [25,60–62]. Our the-
oretical results show how the fourth hypothesis could work and that the third hypothesis
requires extremely restrictive assumptions, making it unlikely to be generally important. The
critical question for future work is how these different hypotheses could be distinguished
empirically.
The second hypothesis, that both private and cooperation traits are favoured under the
same conditions and that there is an efficiency benefit to having them coregulated, does not
require any particularly restrictive assumptions and fits with what we know about traits such
as quorum sensing [25,60,61,63]. We therefore suggest that it is the most likely explanation for
the observed instances of pleiotropy between a private and a cooperative trait in bacteria [1–5].
The third hypothesis, that pleiotropy stabilises cooperation, requires two patterns, neither
of which have been supported by the empirical data. First, we have shown that pleiotropy only
helps stabilise cooperation in conditions where cheats would otherwise invade, if there is some
constraint that forces the personal and cooperative traits to be linked, such that they could
not conceivably be regulated independently (i.e., the link cannot be broken by mutation). Con-
sidering the empirical examples in bacteria, there seems to be no reason that traits such as
cooperative extracellular proteases and private adenosine metabolism could not be regulated
independently [3]. Cheats that stopped producing the cooperative trait by rewiring its control
have actually been shown to emerge and invade cooperative populations [21]. In contrast, in
the D. discoideum example, the cooperation and private traits appear to be controlled by the
same gene, and so it is more plausible that they have to be linked [1].
The second pattern required to support the pleiotropy favours cooperation hypothesis is
that that cooperation was not stabilised by some other factor, such as kin selection. In the
slime mould D. discoideum, the average relatedness in fruiting bodies is r = 0.98 [14], and both
experimental evolution and genomic analyses also support a role of kin selection in favouring
cooperation [16,64,65]. In the bacterium P. aeruginosa, we do not know relatedness in nature,
but clonal growth in spatially structured populations is likely to lead to a high relatedness
[11,48,66–68]. Consequently, there is no evidence that the examples of pleiotropy are in species
in which cooperation is not explained by kin selection.
In contrast, the fourth hypothesis, that cooperation promotes pleiotropy, makes the oppo-
site predictions. It does not matter if the traits could be regulated independently, and pleiot-
ropy is more likely to be observed in cases in which relatedness is high; hence, kin selection
favours cooperation. These requirements are consistent with the empirical examples of
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pleiotropy in both slime moulds and bacteria. The hypotheses could also be distinguished by
experimental evolution. If cooperation stabilises pleiotropy, then if selection for cooperation is
removed, we would expect both pleiotropy and cooperation to be lost over time. Cooperation
could be selected against by imposing low relatedness in cultures [18,54,69,70]. In contrast, if
pleiotropy stabilises cooperation, then even under conditions of low relatedness, cooperation
will be maintained. In addition, as we have discussed above, the hypothesis that cooperation
favours pleiotropy does not necessarily require that the private trait is essential, only that it
confers a sufficiently large fitness advantage.
Conclusions
More generally, our results illustrate how selection on social traits, such as cooperation, can
also shape the genetic architecture [6]. The genetic architecture is not fixed—like any aspect of
an organism, it is subject to natural selection and can evolve [21,42,43,71,72]. We have shown
that, especially in microbes, if cooperation is favoured, this can select for other traits to be
pleiotropically linked with this cooperation. Furthermore, this is only one way in which social
interactions could drive genome evolution. Other possibilities include mutualistic cooperation
leading to genome degradation or gene transfers between species and selection for cheating
leading to genome reduction, genome compartmentalisation, or the sequestering of coopera-
tive traits onto mobile genetic elements [42,43,73–78].
Methods
Analytical model
We model an infinitely large population of haploid individuals. The population is subdivided
into a large number of patches, each of size N. We assume that individuals interact socially
within patches and that generations are nonoverlapping. At this point, we make no assump-
tions as to how social groups are formed except that individuals within a given patch can
potentially be more related to each other than individuals chosen at random from the popula-
tion. Individuals can produce, at personal cost c, a public good molecule that provides a benefit
b/N to each individual on the patch (including the focal). Individuals can also produce a pri-
vate good that is essential for reproduction: private-good nonproducers have their baseline
fecundity reduced by an amount d. We later consider the case in which not producing the pri-
vate trait leads to the individual’s death. We also assume that individuals produce a very large
number of offspring, which all disperse from their natal patch to some new random patch,
such that competition is global (no kin competition). Individuals carry two traits, denoted by
p 2 {0, 1} and h 2 {0, 1}, coding for the production of the private and public good molecules,
respectively. Assuming everyone’s fecundity is always strictly positive, and since competition
is global, the relative fitness a focal individual i on patch j is wi;j ¼ Fi;j=�F , where �F is the average
fecundity in the population.
Public goods cooperation
We first determine when cooperation is favoured in a scenario in which only cooperators and
defectors compete with each other. We assume here that both types express the private-good
trait. Hence, the expected fecundity of a focal defector FD and that of a focal cooperator FC are
given by
FD ¼ 1þ xD N   1ð Þ
b
N
ð1Þ
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and
FC ¼ 1   cþ
b
N
þ xC N   1ð Þ
b
N
; ð2Þ
respectively, where xD and xC are the expected frequencies of cooperators among the coplayers
of a focal defector and cooperator, respectively. Therefore, both types might potentially have a
different social environment, i.e., if xD 6¼ xC. If groups are formed randomly, then xD = xC.
Here, xC − xD is relatedness r [38] and is identical to the interpretation of relatedness as a
regression coefficient of a partner genotype on the focal player’s genotype [36,37]. Because
fecundity is linear in the number of cooperators (the game is of degree 1; [39]), relatedness r is
the only necessary genetic association for describing evolutionary change in this game [38,39].
Thus, cooperators will be favoured whenever their relative fitness wC is greater than that of
defectors wD, which is if
ðxC   xDÞ|fflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflffl}
r
N   1ð Þb
N|fflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflffl}
~b
þ b
N
  c
� �
|fflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflffl}
  ~c
> 0: ð3Þ
Pleiotropic cooperators against private-good nonproducers
Here, we consider the case in which cooperation is linked pleiotropically to a private trait that
is essential for survival and reproduction. Hence, we assume that such private-good nonprodu-
cers suffer a fecundity cost d. We let pleiotropic cooperators compete with such private-good
nonproducers. Therefore, the fecundity of private-good nonproducers is that of defectors (i.e.,
Eq 1) reduced by an amount d, and the fecundity of pleiotropic cooperators remains similar as
that of cooperators (Eq 2). Consequently, pleiotropic cooperators will be favoured over pri-
vate-good nonproducers whenever
ðxC   xDÞ|fflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflffl}
r
N   1ð Þb
N|fflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflffl}
~b
þ b
N
  cþ d
� �
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
  ~c
> 0: ð4Þ
Private goods essential for reproduction
We consider now the scenario in which not producing private goods leads to the individual’s
death. Private-good nonproducers can no longer access public goods, and their share is distrib-
uted equally among the remaining pleiotropic cooperators. With these assumptions, the fecun-
dity of private-good nonproducers becomes FPN = 0, and that of pleiotropic cooperators, FPC,
becomes
FPC ¼ 1   cþ
b
N
þ N   1ð Þ
b
N
¼ 1   cþ b ð5Þ
As we can see, the fitness of pleiotropic cooperators no longer depends on what others do.
Everyone receives the full benefit b. Individuals will be neither more nor less likely than by
chance to receive benefits from kin. Thus, the indirect fitness effect in Hamilton’s rule becomes
b̃ = 0. Hence, pleiotropic cooperators will be favoured over private-good nonproducers when-
ever –c̃> 0, where –c̃ = 1 − c + b. This condition boils down to whether expressing both the
private and public traits results in a net gain or loss. However, for a population of pleiotropic
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cooperators to not go extinct, the average fecundity in the population should not be smaller
than 1, which is whenever b� c.
Individual-based simulations
We ran individual-based simulations to determine the validity of our analytical findings under
a modified, more realistic life cycle in which growth can occur locally on a patch for a certain
number of generations before a dispersal event occurs. Specifically, we consider a variant of
the haystack model [79]. We model a finite population of haploid individuals subdivided into
np = 100 patches. The life cycle is as follows: (1) Each patch is colonized by NF = 100 randomly
selected founding individuals. Each founder produces randomly a very large number of juve-
niles (without mutation), which compete for space on the patch, leaving exactly N = 10 indi-
viduals on each patch (the others die). To vary relatedness on a continuous scale, we assume
that one randomly selected individual among the NF founders will leave relatively more juve-
niles on the patch than the others (see below). (2) Individuals interact socially within patches.
Social interactions influence their fecundity/growth rate (see above). (3) Unrestricted growth
occurs within patches. All offspring survive, and parents die (nonoverlapping generations). (4)
Steps 2 and 3 are repeated over k = 10 generations. This growth phase was implemented to
simulate periods of local growth between migration events, typical of many microbial species.
(v) Individuals disperse globally (every k generations), and exactly NF founders are randomly
selected from the completely mixed global pool to colonise each patch. The remaining individ-
uals die. Unless stated otherwise, we start our simulations with all genotypes in equal propor-
tion. Each parameter combination is run over 105 generations and replicated 16 times.
Patch colonisation and genetic assortment. In our simulations, we varied relatedness r
across the entire range between 0 and 1. To do so, we chose a modified colonisation pattern
than in the standard haystack model, because in the latter, patches are founded by either 1, 2,
3, . . ., or NF founders, which only generates relatedness values of r = 1, 1/2, 1/3, . . ., 1/NF,
respectively.
The colonisation procedure is as follows. Every k generations, all individuals disperse glob-
ally to form a completely mixed pool of potential founders. For each patch, NF = 100 individu-
als are randomly selected from the global pool and compete for reproduction on the patch. We
assume that one random founder among the NF founders arrives first on the patch and repro-
duces until the NF − 1 secondary founders arrive and reproduce as well. Founders reproduce
until there are N = 10 offspring on each patch. In order to vary relatedness between patch
members, we vary the time left before the NF − 1 secondary founders arrive on the patch. This
influences the proportion of the N initial offspring that will descend from the first founder,
and hence, it influences the probability that two randomly chosen offspring from the same
patch descend from the same parent, namely relatedness r.
To implement this, we assign fitness v to the first founder and (1 − v)/(NF − 1) to each of
the remaining NF − 1 secondary founders. Then, exactly N founders are sampled with replace-
ment to be the parent of an offspring, in proportion to their assigned fitness. For example, if
v = 1/NF, the first founder is as likely to reproduce as every other secondary founder, and the
probability that two randomly chosen offspring have the same parent—i.e., relatedness r (r at
generation k = 1)—will be 1/NF. More generally, the relationship between v and r is given by
r = v2 + (1 − v)2/ (NF − 1), where v2 and (1 − v)2/ (NF − 1) are the probabilities that two ran-
domly chosen offspring in a given patch both descend from the first founder and the same sec-
ondary founder, respectively.
To determine the values of v that correspond to our desired values of r (i.e., 0.01, 0.05, 0.1,
. . ., 1) we solved r = v2 + (1 − v)2/(NF − 1) for v and then plugged in our values of r. To confirm
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that our colonisation procedure yielded the expected values of r, we ran neutral simulations
with only two genotypes—cheats and cooperators—and measured r as the difference in fre-
quency of cooperators among the N − 1 partners between cooperators and cheats at the end of
step 1 of the life cycle. S2 Fig confirms that our values of v yielded the predicted values of r in
this neutral model. This figure also shows that relatedness increases during the growth phase
(i.e., during the k = 10 generations of unrestricted growth), especially when the initial r is low.
At high initial r, however, relatedness during the growth phase is mostly eroded by mutations
(S2 Fig).
Growth. After the social interactions, unrestricted growth occurs on each patch (i.e., there
is neither competition for space nor regulation; thus, patch size can potentially grow to infin-
ity). We assume that not producing the private good leads to the individual’s death. Each indi-
vidual that expresses the private trait produces one offspring plus a random number of clonal
offspring (with mutations, see below), which is Poisson distributed around the payoff acquired
during social interactions incremented by a baseline growth rate g. Parent individuals die.
During reproduction (step 3 of the life cycle), each offspring produced undergoes a mutation
with probability μ = 0.001. In this case, the mutation occurs randomly at one of the two loci.
Supporting information
S1 Text. Supplementary information. In this file, we first explore how sensitive our result
that pleiotropy does not stabilise cooperation is to our model assumptions. Specifically, we
explore different mutational pathways for pleiotropy. Second, using individual-based simula-
tions, we explicitly model the pleiotropic link between cooperation and the private trait by
assuming that this link is controlled by a third independent locus.
(PDF)
S1 Table. The importance of pleiotropy in stabilising cooperation in the literature. In this
table, we list previous claims about the general importance of pleiotropy in stabilising coopera-
tion.
(PDF)
S2 Table. The genotypes used in our explicit model of pleiotropy. In this table, we list all the
possible genotypes we used in our explicit model in which the pleiotropic link takes the form
of a universal regulator.
(PDF)
S1 Fig. Pleiotropy can help stabilise all forms of social trait. We consider all possible
forms of social interaction by considering a trait that has a fecundity effect −c for the individ-
ual performing it and a fecundity effect b that is shared amongst all the members of the
group. If b> 0, then the trait is helpful, providing a benefit to both self and others (public
good), whereas if b< 0, then the trait is harming and costly to both self and others. If c> 0,
then the trait has some fecundity cost to perform, but if c< 0, then performing the trait pro-
vides some fecundity benefit. The area to the left of the dashed line shows where the trait will
be favoured when the trait also has some pleiotropic private benefit. The dark coloured area
is when the trait would be favoured without the pleiotropic private trait. The light coloured
area represents the extent to which pleiotropy can help stabilise social traits. We denote the
lifetime fitness cost and benefits by c̃ = c − b/N − d and b̃ = (N − 1) b/N, respectively. We fol-
low Rousset [80] by dividing the figure with the lines c̃ = 0 (c = b/N + d) and b̃ = 0 (b = 0)
into the four classes of social behaviours—mutually beneficial, altruism, spite, and selfish-
ness. This classification holds for when the trait has some pleiotropic private benefit.
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Parameters: N = 10, r = 0.5, d = 0.4.
(TIF)
S2 Fig. Relatedness in neutral runs. Shown is the average relatedness of 16 replicates during
the last 20,000 generations, as a function of the fitness v of the first founder. Relatedness
increases between step 1 and step k = 10 of the life cycle, especially at low initial relatedness. At
higher values of initial r, relatedness is mostly eroded by mutations. This increase in relatedness
during the growth phase is explained as follows. Consider, for example, a neutral model in
which the number of cooperators and cheats doubles in each patch. Hence, the within-patch
proportion of cooperators remains unchanged. However, the frequency of cooperators
among the N − 1 partners experienced by a focal cooperator increases, and that of a focal cheat
decreases. For example, if at generation t, a patch contains 2 cooperators and 1 cheat. Then, a
focal cooperator has 1 cooperator and 1 cheat in its group (0.5:0.5), whereas a focal cheat has 2
cooperators and 0 cheats in its group (1:0). At generation t + 1, population size doubles. Hence,
a focal cooperator now has 3 cooperators and 2 cheats in its group (0.6:0.4), whereas a focal
cheat now has 4 cooperators and 1 cheat in its group (0.8:0.2). The frequency of cooperators
among the social partners of a focal cooperator increases, and that of a focal cheat decreases.
Therefore, relatedness increases as population size increases, as long as there remains some
nonhomogeneous groups (in homogeneous groups, the frequency of cooperators among social
partners no longer changes). Parameters: c = 0.1, g = 0.5, μ = 0.001.
(TIF)
S3 Fig. Pleiotropy promotes cooperation and anything else. Pleiotropic cooperators com-
pete with noncooperative private nonproducers. Shown is the average pleiotropy as a function
of the production cost c and the public good benefit b. Pleiotropy prevails even when produc-
ing public goods is harmful to both the actor and its partners—i.e., b� 0—as long as express-
ing both the private and social traits leads to a fitness that is greater or equal to 1. Otherwise,
the population goes extinct (white area). Parameters: c = 0.1, g = 0.5, μ = 0.001.
(TIF)
S4 Fig. Pleiotropy and the cost of not producing the private good. Pleiotropic cooperators
compete with noncooperative private nonproducers. Pleiotropy prevails as long as expressing
both the private and cooperation trait leads to a sufficiently better growth rate. Otherwise, non-
cooperative private nonproducers prevail (white area). In these runs, relatedness, r = 0.01, which
represents the most difficult condition for nonpleiotropic cooperation to evolve in our simula-
tion. The baseline growth rate of pleiotropic cooperators g = 0.5. Parameters: c = 0.1, μ = 0.001.
(TIF)
S5 Fig. Pleiotropy and a mutational bias of 10. Losing a function (i.e., cooperation, private
trait, and pleiotropy) is 10 times more likely than gaining one. For example, if a mutation
occurs in a nonpleiotropic cooperator, it has 10 times more chances to lead to a loss of either
cooperation or private production than a gain of the pleiotropic link. As before, cooperation
only evolves when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied. However, pleiotropy is only favoured under
high relatedness and large cooperation benefits and a high mutation rate. Panels (a) and (c)
show the frequency of cooperation, and panels (b) and (d) show their respective proportion
of pleiotropic cooperators. The dashed line represents the analytical prediction for when
Hamilton’s rule is satisfied, assuming that migration occurs every generation (i.e., k = 1 in Eq 3
in the main text). In all panels, all genotypes and mutations I and II in Fig 3 of the main text
are allowed. Parameters: c = 0.1, g = 0.5, k = 10.
(TIF)
Pleiotropy and cooperation
PLOS Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2006671 October 25, 2018 18 / 25
S6 Fig. Pleiotropy and a mutational bias of 100. Losing a function (i.e., cooperation, private
trait, and pleiotropy) is 100 times more likely than gaining one. For example, if a mutation
occurs in a nonpleiotropic cooperator, it has 100 times more chances to lead to a loss of either
cooperation or private production than a gain of the pleiotropic link. As before, cooperation
only evolves when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied. However, pleiotropy is only favoured with relat-
edness and cooperation benefits close to 1 and a high mutation rate. Panels (a) and (c) show
the frequency of cooperation, and panels (b) and (d) show their respective proportion of pleio-
tropic cooperators. The dashed line represents the analytical prediction for when Hamilton’s
rule is satisfied, assuming that migration occurs every generation (i.e., k = 1 in Eq 3 in the
main text). In all panels, all genotypes and mutations I and II in Fig 3 in the main text are
allowed. Parameters: c = 0.1, g = 0.5, k = 10.
(TIF)
S7 Fig. Cooperation and pleiotropy frequencies in different scenarios. Each column repre-
sents a distinct scenario, whose corresponding genetic architecture is shown at the top. In (a-
c) and (j-l), pleiotropy can revert to nonpleiotropic cooperation (mutation II in Fig 3 in the
main text). In (d-f) and (j-l), mutations on the cooperation trait in pleiotropic individuals are
possible and generate cheats. In (j-l), mutations on the private trait in pleiotropic individuals
are possible. Pleiotropy prevails only when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied when in competition
with all nonpleiotropic genotypes (Fig 3 in the main text). Whenever pleiotropy cannot revert
to a two-regulator system (panels d-i), the population is entirely invaded by pleiotropic coop-
erators. Parameters: c = 0.1, g = 0.5.
(TIF)
S8 Fig. Genetic elements in the explicit model. We model more explicitly the pleiotropic link
between the private and cooperation genes. Each gene is expressed only if both the expressing
version of the allele (C or P) and the corresponding expressing version of its regulator (filled
regA for the private trait and filled regB for the cooperation trait) are present. We assume that
each regulator can be lost and that the private regulator, regA, can become pleiotropic by being
able to regulate both genes at the same time (pointy orange circle). During reproduction, each
regulator mutates independently with probability μR, and each gene mutates with probability
μ. We assume that the private trait is essential, so in case the private regulator and/or private
gene is lost through mutation, the individual dies. All the possible genotypes resulting from
these elements and their corresponding phenotypes are listed in S2 Table.
(TIF)
S9 Fig. Cooperation and pleiotropy when the pleiotropic link is explicitly modelled as a
universal regulator. Panels (a) and (c) show the frequency of cooperation, and panels (b) and
(d) show their respective relative proportion of pleiotropic cooperators (i.e., frequency of
genotype number g20 + g24 over the sum of frequencies of the genotype number g16, g20,
g24). The dashed line represents the analytical prediction r(N − 1)b/N = c − b/N, for when
Hamilton’s rule is satisfied, assuming that migration occurs every generation (i.e., k = 1).
Parameters: np = 500, c = 0.1, g = 0.5, k = 10, μR = 0.001.
(TIF)
S10 Fig. Proportion of cheats produced by mutation when the pleiotropic link is explicitly
modelled as a universal regulator. All panels show the proportion of cheats produced during
a single growth phase for different values of the cooperation benefit b and mutation rate μ.
Each patch is started with 10 cooperators, and the x axis shows the number of those coopera-
tors for which cooperation was pleiotropically linked to an essential private trait, using pleio-
tropic cooperators with genotype number g20 (a-b) or g24 (c-d). Increased pleiotropy leads to
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a decreased accumulation of cheats. Each bar represents the average of 104 patches. Parame-
ters: c = 0.1, g = 0.5, k = 10, μR = 0.001.
(TIF)
S11 Fig. Cooperation and pleiotropy in neutral runs when the pleiotropic link is explicitly
modelled as a universal regulator. Panels (a) and (c) show the frequency of cooperation,
which ranges between 0.36 and 0.38. This is because there are three cooperative genotypes
among a total of 8 viable genotypes (S2 Table), with 3/8 = 0.375. Panels (b) and (d) show their
respective relative proportion of pleiotropic cooperators (i.e., frequency of genotype number
g20 + g24 over the sum of frequencies of the genotype number g16, g20, g24). The dashed line
represents the analytical prediction r(N − 1)b/N = c − b/N, for when Hamilton’s rule is satis-
fied, assuming that migration occurs every generation (i.e., k = 1). All runs are neutral with
respect to the cooperation trait but not the essential private trait; i.e., all individuals that
express the essential private trait have fitness 1 + g, whereas the others die. Parameters: np =
500, g = 0.5, k = 10, μR = 0.001.
(TIF)
S12 Fig. Pleiotropy between two privately beneficial traits. As in our baseline scenario, the
private trait is essential. However, the cooperation trait is replaced by a second privately bene-
ficial trait (with b = 0 and c< 0). As a result, individuals expressing both private traits can
either be pleiotropic or nonpleiotropic. In both panels, individuals with a pleiotropic link
between two private traits are never more common than individuals without this pleiotropic
link, as their proportion never exceeds 50%. Parameters: b = 0, g = 0.5, k = 10.
(TIF)
S13 Fig. Cooperation and pleiotropy with fluctuating benefit b. The benefit of cooperation
is alternating between 0 and the value shown on the y axis every 10 generations (i.e., every
growth phase). Cooperation is less likely to evolve under such fluctuating environment, and
pleiotropy only evolves when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied. Panels (a) and (c) show the frequency
of cooperation, and panels (b) and (d) show their respective proportion of pleiotropic coopera-
tors. The dashed line represents the analytical prediction for when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied,
assuming that the benefit is b/2 and that migration occurs every generation (i.e., k = 1; and
substituting b = b/2 in Eq 3 in the main text). In all panels, all genotypes and mutations I and
II in Fig 3 of the main text are allowed. Parameters: c = 0.1, g = 0.5, k = 10.
(TIF)
S14 Fig. Cooperation with and without pleiotropy and fluctuating benefit b. The benefit of
cooperation is alternating between 0 and the value shown on the y axis every 10 generations
(i.e., every growth phase). Cooperation is more likely to evolve if pleiotropy is allowed. In (a)
and (b), pleiotropic cooperators are allowed (all genotypes and mutations I and II in Fig 3 in
the main text). In (c) and (d), pleiotropic cooperators are replaced by nonpleiotropic coopera-
tors (this maintains a similar ratio of cooperative strategies to when pleiotropic cooperators
are present). Panels (e) and (f) show the difference in cooperation frequency between (a) and
(c) and (b) and (d), respectively. The dashed line represents the analytical prediction for when
Hamilton’s rule is satisfied, assuming that the benefit is b/2 and that migration occurs every
generation (i.e., k = 1; and substituting b = b/2 in Eq 3 in the main text). Parameters: c = 0.1,
g = 0.5, k = 10.
(TIF)
S15 Fig. Cooperation and pleiotropy with fluctuating population structure. Population
structure (relatedness r) is alternating between 0.01 and the value shown on the x axis every 10
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generations (i.e., every growth phase). Cooperation is less likely to evolve under such fluctuat-
ing environment, and pleiotropy only evolves when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied. Panels (a)
and (c) show the frequency of cooperation, and panels (b) and (d) show their respective pro-
portion of pleiotropic cooperators. The dashed line represents the analytical prediction for
when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied assuming that relatedness is (r + 0.01)/2 and that migration
occurs every generation (i.e., k = 1; and substituting r = [r + 0.01)/2 in Eq 3 in the main text).
In all panels, all genotypes and mutations I and II in Fig 3 of the main text are allowed. Param-
eters: c = 0.1, g = 0.5, k = 10.
(TIF)
S16 Fig. Cooperation with and without pleiotropy and fluctuating population structure.
Population structure (relatedness r) is alternating between 0.01 and the value shown on the x
axis every 10 generations (i.e., every growth phase). Cooperation is more likely to evolve if plei-
otropy is allowed. In (a) and (b), pleiotropic cooperators are allowed (all genotypes and muta-
tions I and II in Fig 3 of the main text). In (c) and (d), pleiotropic cooperators are replaced by
nonpleiotropic cooperators (this maintains a similar ratio of cooperative strategies to when
pleiotropic cooperators are present). Panels (e) and (f) show the difference in cooperation fre-
quency between (a) and (c) and (b) and (d), respectively. The dashed line represents the analyt-
ical prediction for when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied assuming that relatedness is (r + 0.01)/2
and that migration occurs every generation (i.e., k = 1; and substituting r = [r + 0.01]/2 in Eq 3
in the main text). Parameters: c = 0.1, g = 0.5, k = 10.
(TIF)
S17 Fig. Cooperation promotes pleiotropy under relaxed assumptions. Panels (a) and (c)
show the frequency of cooperation for different mutation rates μ, and panels (b) and (d) show
their respective proportion of pleiotropy relative to all cooperative genotypes (i.e., pleiotropic
cooperators, nonpleiotropic cooperators, and cooperative private nonproducers). The dashed
lines represent the analytical prediction for when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied assuming that
migration occurs every generation (i.e., k = 1; Eq 3 in the main text). Panel (e) shows the pro-
portion of cheats produced by mutation and growth during a single growth phase (mutation
rate μ = 0.005) for different values of the cooperation benefit b. Each patch is started with 10
cooperators, and the x axis shows the number of those cooperators for which cooperation was
pleiotropically linked to an essential private trait. Increased pleiotropy leads to a decreased
accumulation of cheats, but to a lesser extent than when mutations in pleiotropic individuals
cannot generate cheats (compare panel [c] with Fig 4C in the main text). Each bar represents
the average of 104 patches. Parameters: c = 0.1, g = 0.5, k = 10.
(TIF)
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